Managers\u27 Discretion and Investors\u27 Welfare: Theories and Evidence by Easterbrook, Frank H.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1984
Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence
Frank H. Easterbrook
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank H. Easterbrook, "Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence," 9 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law
540 (1984).
[Vol. 9
MANAGERS' DISCRETION AND INVESTORS' WELFARE:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*
For the last fifty years, public discussion of corporations and public
policy toward corporations have been dominated by the vision of Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means.' Berle and Means portrayed managers
as out of control. Berle and Means attributed this to the "separation
of ownership and control" -another term for a division of labor in
which some people specialize in risk-bearing through investment, while
others specialize in management. When thousands of people hold in-
vestment interests in a firm, none has much incentive to oversee the
managers. Each investor, rightly thinking that his efforts can do little,
will be passive. The investors are scattered, uncoordinated, and helpless.
They have ownership without control; the managers have control
without ownership.
Berle and Means also thought that corporations were growing in
size and influence. Their great size would give them power over con-
sumers; they could charge "administered prices" without regard to
competitive forces. The managers, responsible to no one, could exploit
investors and consumers alike.
Berle and Means welcomed the emerging class of managerial
technocrats. They saw specialist managers as a way of making
corporations more efficient producers. They therefore proposed not
control of managers by investors, but control of corporations by govern-
ment. In the Berle and Means vision, technocratic managers would
run the firms, making goods and services in ever-increasing quan-
tities. Investors would be paid enough to keep them satisfied. Public
regulators would direct corporate policy in the interest of society as
a whole.
The goal of public control animated many of those who wrote
and adopted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. William 0. Douglas worked to obtain for the SEC the
power to make important decisions for the firms. Those who agreed
* Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank
WalterJ. Blum, Dennis W. Carlton, Daniel R. Fischel, Geoffrey Miller, and Roberta
Romano for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This article is part of a larger
project, tentatively entitled The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, on which Daniel
R. Fischel and I are working.
1. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
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with Berle and Means stopped with half-a-loaf during the New Deal,
however. The principal securities acts required disclosure yet avoided
substantive regulation. The regulatory agencies were confined to
overseeing particular industries, such as transportation and communica-
tions, rather than corporations in general.
Even the incomplete victories of the Berle and Means approach
have come under pressure. Regulation is increasingly seen as the con-
sequence of interest-group politics, in which the regulated firms
themselves obtain regulation in order to forestall competition. A wave
of deregulation in transportation, communications, and even the
securities exchanges has led to new entry, lower prices, and pressure
for still more deregulation.
The Berle and Means vision nevertheless lingers in the rhetoric
of regulators, academics, and even corporate officials. All continue
to emphasize the helplessness of investors in the face of managers.
This is the underpinning of the ALI's proposals on corporate
governance. 2
Although the ALI's drafters do not set out their premises, their
proposals and arguments seem to rest on the Berle and Means diagnosis
of helplessness. They believe that managers have seized control, that
investors are powerless, and that other forms of control (such as
competitive product markets, competition among managers, and com-
petition for corporate control) have failed.3 Nonetheless, they do not
propose the Berle and Means cure of public control. They recommend
instead that control be transferred from managers to "independent"
directors, who will be a majority of the board and will review com-
pensation and all significant dealings between managers and the firms.
They view independent directors as a cure for "market failure." They
also recommend that some kinds of transactions be banned outright
and that managers and investors alike be prohibited from adopting
2. The ALI has authorized the drafting of the Principles of Corporate Gorer-
itance: Analysis and Recommendations, but the drafts to date are proposals of the Chief
Reporter and his staff. Only a few have been discussed by the Institute, and none
has been finally adopted. I refer to them as "the ALI's proposals" with the recogni-
tion that this shorthand is not accurate.
3. See Princples of Corporate Gorernance: Analysis and Recommendations (Tent. Draft
No. 2) at 54, 74-76 (1983). The draft not only fails to set out a clear approach but
also appears to draw on contradictory premises. See Romano, Aettapolitics and Corporate
Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 956-63 (1984); Weiss, Economic Analys s, Corporate
Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1984).
Things are dearer in the recent work of Melvin Eisenberg, now the Chief Reporter
of the project. See Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essa for Bill ary,
37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 187 (1983), which is filled with unsupported assertions that
managers and state law exploit investors and does not cite, let alone discuss, any
contrary data and theory.
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contracts at variance with the terms laid down in the ALI's model code.
The ALI's proposals remove control from self-interested managers,
ignorant (and passive) investors, and bureaucrats dominated by interest
groups. They place it in the hands of disinterested directors and
disinterested judges. The drafters evidently hope that these two
disinterested groups will achieve the benefits of knowledgeable manage-
ment without the taint of self-interest.
There is a curious flavor to the Berle and Means vision. They
(and the ALI's drafters) see the world as if everyone awakened one
morning to find himself a manager or an investor. The veil of ig-
norance was suddenly parted. The manager stepped out and exalted:
"Aha! No one can stop me!" The investor gasped: "Woe is me, I'm
powerless. Only the ALI can save me now!"
This vision omits dynamic elements vital to an appreciation of
corporate organization. Managers and investors do not wake up in
this way. They assume their roles with knowledge of the consequences.
Investors part with their money willingly, putting dollars in equities
instead of debt, T-Bills, land, or gold because they believe the returns
of equities are more attractive. Managers obtain their positions after
much trouble and toil, competing against others who desire the same
posts. There are no third-party effects; all interested people participate
in the process, so the correct incentives are in play. Corporations are
born small and grow. They must attract customers and investors by
promising and delivering what those people value. Corporations that do
not do so will not survive. When Berle and Means observe that firms
are very large in relation to single investors, they observe the product
of success in satisfying investors and customers.
My purpose in this paper is to identify some of the dynamic
elements that the Berle-Means-ALI vision leaves out. I discuss some
of the ways in which competition over the course of years and decades
induces managers to act in the interests of investors, even if each in-
vestor is powerless.
A warning. None of the competitive devices is costless or perfect.
Indeed, all are quite costly, and all together leave room for occasional
fraud and managerial slack. We live in an imperfect world. There
is bound to be some divergence between investors' interests and
managers' actions. The ALI's proposals rest on the view that if markets
have costs and imperfections, then we need legal rules to overcome
them. This is a non-sequitur. The observation that there are costs
requires us to ask further questions. How large is the divergence? Can
it be reduced by new legal rules without incurring costs that exceed
the benefits? These are empirical questions, and I offer some evidence
that bears on them. The evidence is not conclusive, but it is powerfully
[Vol. 9
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suggestive. It supports the conclusion that markets operating under
current legal rules (such as prohibitions against fraud and general
fiduciary duties) have been quite successful in aligning the interests
of investors and managers.
Existing rules, enforced by private suits and the criminal law,
are important in inducing managers to take care of investors' interests.
Contractual promises of faithful service would be worth much less in
the absence of these rules. But they are not the only safeguards, or
even necessarily the most important ones. I discuss below three market
mechanisms that also induce managers to act in the interest of in-
vestors. The first is the managers' desire to raise money, which they
must do if they are to have anything to manage. To raise money,
they must promise to control themselves and to act as honest agents
of investors. The second mechanism is the market for the firm's stock
and products. Managers must continue to run the firm well to avoid
failing in these markets. If they fail, they soon will lose their jobs (or
chunks of their compensation). Even managers with assurance of tenure
must succeed in these markets to have funds they can appropriate.
The third market is the one in "corporate control." Managerial teams
monitor each other, and they wage proxy fights and tender offers if
performance declines.
I. THE MARKET FOR CAPITAL:
COMPETITION TO ATTRACT INVESTORS
A. Theory
I have sketched the Berle and Means theory above. Their approach
starts with an assumption that managers act in their own interest rather
than in that of investors, adds the fact that investors are too widely
scattered to control managers, and concludes that managers' discre-
tion is effectively unchecked (or at least "inadequately" checked). Hav-
ing obtained control, managers will misuse their position. The investors
need help.
A different theoretical tradition asks just how it is that managers
came to control such resources.4 Berle and Means were not the first
to notice that scattered investors can't control managers. The investors
4. The outstanding contribution is Jensen & Meckling, Thro
, 
of the Fir:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FI.N. Eco.N. 305 (1976).
But this tradition is at least as old as that of Berle and Means. Set Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). Other important contributions include
1984]
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knew so, too. Indeed, the costs of divergence of interest ("agency costs
of management") are common knowledge.
If the investors knew that the managers would have excessive
discretion, why did they give their money to these managers in the
first place? If managers promise to return but a pittance, the investors
will not put up very much money. The investors simply pay less for
the paper the firms issue. There is therefore a limitation on managers'
efforts to enrich themselves at investors' expense. Managers may do
their best to take advantage of investors, but they find that the dynamics
of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at
heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.
The corporation and its securities are products to as great an extent
as the sewing machines or other items the firm produces. Just as the
founders of a firm have incentives to make the kinds of sewing machines
people want to buy, they have incentives to create the kind of firm,
governance structure, and securities people value. The founders of
the firm will find it profitable to promise the governance structure
that is most beneficial to investors, net of the costs of maintaining
the structure. Managers who seek resources to control will have to
promise more returns to investors. Those who promise the highest
returns, and make the promises binding, hence believable, will obtain
the largest investments.
The first question facing managers is what promises to make,
and the second is how to induce investors to believe the promises.
Empty promises are worthless. Answering the first question depends
on finding ways to reduce the effects of divergent interests; answering
the second depends on finding legal and automatic enforcement devices.
Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 777 (1972); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 1427 (1964); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON.
110 (1965); and Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977). See also M. Jensen & C. Smith, Shareholder,
Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, University of Rochester
MERC Working Paper 84-03 (Jan. 1984), for a summary of the theory; Easterbrook
& Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv 669, 673-79,
687-92 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure] (discuss-
ing managers' incentives to creative securities and provide disclosure that investors
prefer). The theory I advance here is evolutionary. Jensen & Meckling give a static
argument for which evolution is a less apt metaphor, but Jensen's more recent work
is expressly an evolutionary argument.
[Vol. 9
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The more automatic the enforcement, the more investors will believe
the promises.
What promises will the managers make to induce investors to
hand over more money? It should be plain that no one set of promises
is suited for all firms at all times. No one thinks that the governance
structure used for a small business will work well for Exxon. The "best"
structure cannot be derived from theory; it must be developed by ex-
perience. We should be deeply skeptical of claims that any one struc-
ture or class of structures is best. But we can see the sorts of promises
that are likely to emerge in the competition for investments.
Some promises may entail submitting to scrutiny in advance of
action. The managers may set up prior monitoring. Outside directors
may watch inside ones; inside directors may watch other managers;
managers may hire detectives to watch the employees. At other times,
though, prior monitoring may be too costly in relation to its benefits,
and the most desirable methods of control will rest on deterrence, on
letting people act as they wish but penalizing certain conduct. Fiduciary
obligations and derivative litigation are forms of subsequent settling-up
that are among these effective protections of the agency relation. Still
other methods operate automatically. Managers enjoy hefty salaries
and perquisites of office; the threat of losing these can induce managers
to act in investors' interest.
Managers select the state of incorporation. States offer different
menus of devices (from voting by shareholders to fiduciary rules to
derivative litigation) for the protection of investors. The managers who
pick the state of incorporation that is most desirable from the perspec-
tive of investors will attract the most money. The states that select
the best combination of rules will attract the most corporate investment
(and therefore increase tax collections). So states compete to offer, and
managers compete to use, beneficial sets of legal rules. These include
not only rules about governance structures but also fiduciary rules and
prohibitions of fraud.
Managers select when to go public. Less experienced managers
start with their own money or with venture capital, which comes with
extensive strings. The venture capitalists control the operation of the
firm with some care. Only after the managerial team and structure
have matured will the firm issue public securities.
Managers make promises in the articles of incorporation and the
securities they issue when they go public. The debt investors will receive
exceptionally detailed promises in indentures. These promises will
concern the riskiness of the firm's operations, the extent to which earn-
ings may be paid out, and the domain of managerial discretion. These
promises benefit equity investors as well as debt investors. The equity
1984]
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investors usually receive votes rather than explicit promises. 5 These
voting rules make it possible for the investors to replace the managers.
(Those who believe that managers have unchecked control should ask
themselves why the organizers of a firm ever issue equity claims that
enable the investors to replace the managers.) The managers also
promise, explicitly or otherwise, to abide by the standards of "fair
dealing" embedded in the fiduciary rules of state law. Sometimes they
make additional promises.
To sum up: self-interested managers, just like other investors,
are driven to find the devices most likely to reduce agency costs. If
they do not, they pay in lower prices for corporate paper. Any one
firm may deviate from the optimal measures. Over tens of years and
thousands of firms, though, tendencies emerge. The firms and managers
that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative to others.
Because the choices do not impose costs on strangers to the contracts,
what is optimal for the firms and investors is optimal for society. We
can learn a great deal simply by observing Which devices are widely
used and which are not.
It is important to distinguish between isolated transactions and
governance structures. There are high costs of operating capital and
managerial markets, just as there are high costs of other methods of
dealing with the agency relation. It is inevitable that a substantial
amount of undesirable slack or self-dealing will escape punishment by
markets. The question is not whether this occurs, but whether the
costs of this shirking can be reduced by mechanisms that are not
themselves more costly. We accept some costly conduct because the
costs of the remedy are even greater. We also use deterrence (say,
the threat of punishment for fraud) rather than other forms of legal
control when deterrence is the most economical method of handling
a problem.
Markets that let particular episodes of wrongdoing slide by, or
legal systems that use deterrence rather than structural change to handle
the costs of management, are likely very effective in making judgments
about optimal governance structures. Governance structures are open
and notorious, unlike the conduct they seek to control. Costs of ob-
taining information about a firm's governance are low. Firms and teams
of managers can compete with each other over time to design govern-
ance structures and to build in penalties for malfeasance. There is
no substantial impediment to the operation of the competitive process
at the level of structure. Contractual promises and fiduciary rules arise
as a result of these considerations.
5. For an analysis of why voting rules are as they are, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
[Vol. 9
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B. Evidence
It is not easy to test the divergent theories presented above. Testing
depends on finding differing predictions about observable things, and
these are rarer than one might think. Suppose Bele and Means are
right, and managers will not implement the governance structures that
are most beneficial to investors but instead select rules that make shirk-
ing and appropriation of investors' funds easy. This implies that
securities in firms sell for less than they would fetch if managers made
enforceable promises to act in investors' interests. Yet how could we
detect this?
We cannot measure this gap by comparing one firm against
another, because each firm is a unique bundle of assets, prospects,
and managers. We also cannot compare the price of, say, Apple Com-
puter stock under optimal governance structures with its actual price.
We cannot even compare the consequences to investors of putting
money into the hands of exploiting managers versus the consequences
of entrusting money to "better" managers (or managerial teams that
have established better governance structures). Because no group of
managers has power in the market for capital assets, the investors would
do equally well entrusting money to either group. They would just
pay less in the first instance for the stock of the firms that had inferior
structures.
One type of inquiry that might help to differentiate the theories
is whether firms adopt "investor protection" policies in the absence
of legal compulsion to do so. There is substantial evidence along these
lines.
Firms voluntarily arrange with debt investors to restrict managers'
discretion. The promises in indentures-most of them wholly
contractual-are extensive. Firms voluntarily issue equity securities
with voting rights attached, even though these rights allow the investors
to evict managers. Firms could confine voting securities to the managers
themselves, issuing only nonvoting stock to outside investors, but they
do not. 6 They vote on many issues, such as the level of executive
compensation, on which the decision of the board would be binding
even without shareholders' approval. Firms place "disinterested" direc-
tors on their boards in large numbers, although no law requires this.
6. The New York Stock Exchange declines to list the securities of firms with
nonvoting common stock. This is a wholly private arrangement. No rule requires
it, and other exchanges (such as the American) do not have the same requirement.
1984]
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These directors, and others invited onto the board by managers,
frequently oust their former patrons and bring in new managers because
they conclude that the existing ones are no longer best for the firm.
Long before federal law required annual audits by independent
accountants, every firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange had
such annual reviews. Indeed, auditing has existed for as long as firms
have existed.7 Similarly, firms made extensive disclosures to investors
well before state and federal law required such disclosures. To a substan-
tial degree, federal law simply codified the accepted disclosure prac-
tice of the established investment banks and underwriters. 8 Today,
despite the many rules requiring disclosure of particular facts, two
thirds of large corporations' disclosure expenditures are incurred to
supply information in excess of that required by law.9
All of this evidence suggests that managers do not need legal
commands to induce them to establish governance structures that serve
investors' interests. Nonetheless, the evidence is rather impressionistic.
How much independent auditing is the "right" amount in the investors'
interest? Was the amount of disclosure before 1934 the "right" amount,
or is it "right" now? (Maybe neither is optimal.) How can we know
whether firms are acting to assist investors or to stave off further legal
regulation?
Evidence from the stock market provides a cleaner test. Firms
can increase the price of their stock by selecting articles of incorpora-
tion and other "constitutional" rules beneficial to investors. Although
we cannot observe the effects of these provisions directly at the time
If managers wanted to exploit their control to the fullest, we would expect them to
induce the NYSE to change the rule, or to list their firms on the American or NASDAQ
systems. (It is no answer to say that firms "must list on the NYSE to get the prestige
and advantages of the largest, most liquid exchange." If managers wanted to reclaim
control of voting, they would list on the American, which then would be the largest
exchange, with all the "advantages" firms now get on the NYSE.)
7. For a sampling of the evidence, see Benston, Security for Investors, in IN-
STEAD OF REGULATION 169 (R. Poole ed. 1981); Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Prob-
lems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & Econ. 613 (1983).
8. This is one reason, among many others, why the apparently promising
approach of seeing whether investors have done "better" after the securities acts does
not reveal whether managers act optimally in investors' interests without legal com-
pulsion. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 4, at 707-14, for
a summary of the evidence developed in such comparisons and an assessment of why
the data are not illuminating.
9. S. PHILLIPS &J.R. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 50 (1981)
(Table 3.3).
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firms first go public, we can observe the effects of changes. One im-
portant "constitutional" choice is the state of incorporation. State law
provides many of the rules by which the firm operates day to day.
Most of these are just "fallback" rules that govern when the articles
are silent; a few are mandatory. State law also includes the fiduciary
principle, a guarantee of honest and "fair" dealing when firms do
not spell out in the articles exactly how certain transactions will be
handled. Both the statutory and fiduciary rules vary slightly from state
to state, so the place of incorporation will influence investors' welfare.
For several decades, Delaware's law has afforded managers the
greatest discretion. The statutory law allows almost unlimited altera-
tion of rules in the articles and bylaws, which managers control. And
the Delaware fiduciary principle allows most forms of self-dealing trans-
actions, so long as the terms approximate those that might be reached
in arms' length bargaining. In Delaware managers may pursue "cor-
porate opportunities" after obtaining the board's consent, and they
may engage in mergers, going-private transactions, and other deals
that squeeze out public shareholders at prices set largely by the
managers. These and other features of Delaware law led scholars in
the Berle and Means tradition to conclude that Delaware had won
a "race for the bottom." 10 By enhancing managers' discretion, they
argued, Delaware had sacrificed investors' interests.
This is a wonderfully testable proposition. Delaware law increases
managers' discretion. If the Berle and Means hypothesis is correct,
firms that move their place of incorporation to Delaware do poorly
for their investors. Lower expected earnings will lead to lower prices
in the stock market." If, on the other hand, markets constrain managers
to act in investors' interest, then a move to Delaware would be neutral
or even lead to an increase in the price of stock.
10. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflsctions Upon Ddlaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974). The flexibility and managerial discretion to which Cary objected
continue to characterize Delaware law. On the statutory side, see, e.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (board may delegate), § 144 (standards of self-dealing conduct),
9 228 (majority may act without meeting), § 251 (limits on shareholders' role in
mergers), § 262 (limits on appraisal remedy). On the judicial side, see, e.g., Aronson.
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Sup. 1984) (strong business judgment rule protects
discretionary decisions unless director is on both sides of transaction); Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Sup. 1983) (approving freezeout mergers in principle,
limiting judicial inquiry, and holding appraisal remedy exclusive in absence of fraud);
Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089 (Del. Ch. 1983) (approving leveraged buyout; apply-
ing "equal dignity principle" to allow managers to choose the least-restricted way
to conduct any transaction).
11. The price of stock depends on investors' evaluation of their future returns.
1984]1
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Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich looked at what happened to
the investors in the 140 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange
that had moved their place of incorporation to Delaware between 1927
and 1977. They found these firms were doing better than expected
before the move (that is, their stocks were rising compared with port-
folios of similar stocks), that the price of their stock rose still further
in the month the move was announced, and that the price continued
to rise after the move. 12 The total unexpected gain was about 2.9%
in the eighty days surrounding the move, 11.65 % over a longer period.
The verdict of investors: an increase in managers' discretion was
beneficial, not detrimental. This is a substantial challenge to the Berle
and Means hypothesis, substantial support for the hypothesis that
markets induce managers to act in investors' interest.
This does not mean that more discretion is always better. It means,
rather, that the existence of choice, of ability to elect a high-discretion
system, is beneficial. For many firms at many times, it is advantageous
to hem in managers' discretion. One need only think of close corpora-
tions to see why and to see restrictions in practice. The existence of
different ownership structures also implies the utility of different legal
Reduce the expected returns, holding other things constant, and the price of stock
will fall. Increase the returns and it will rise. All of the stock market research reported
below uses this principle. It holds constant other changes in the economy and particular
industries by identifying the difference between how a firm's stock does on a day
when there is "news" and how it would have been expected to do-given its past
volatility and relation to the rest of the market-had there been no news specific to
the firm. See Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J. L.
& EcoN. 121 (1981), and Brown & Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of
Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (1985), for an explanation of the method.
This approach does not depend on stock prices being efficient in the sense that
they correctly reflect all information about each firm. It rests, rather, on the assump-
tion that the degree of accuracy does not change radically over short periods. Thus
if the price of stock rises 1% relative to expectations, and the new price is not "more
accurate" than the old, it is appropriate to conclude that the increase reflects "good
news" worth approximately 1% of the equity in the firm. Because prices of stock
are substantially influenced, if not determined, by the professional investors who have
prompt access to news and who control pools of capital that they can shift rapidly
from one stock to another, it is unlikely that any bit of information about a firm
(or category of firms) could cause a sudden change in the extent to which prices reflect
real values. Thus the implications laid out in the following text are adequately supported
by the methodology. See also R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN
FROM COMMON STOCKS (2d ed. 1983), [hereinafter cited as R. BREALEY] for informa-
tion on the methodology and its reliability.
12. Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competi-
tion" vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
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structures, so that managers and investors can choose the legal struc-
ture best suited to their needs. One recent study showed that both
"loose" and "strict" laws can be advantageous for different kinds
of firmns, and that firms migrate to the states whose legal structures
are best adapted to the firms' ownership structure.' 3
It is possible to examine the effects of adding discretion-increasing
rules to articles of incorporation. Financial economists are performing
such studies in increasing numbers. So far the results are mixed, as
we should expect in light of the fact that more discretion is not always
better. Some studies find gains for investors. But studies of "shark
repellent" amendments to charters-that is, provisions giving managers
greater discretion to defeat tender offers-come to conflicting
conclusions.' 4 It seems safe to say that studies will find examples of
some managerial conduct harmful to shareholders. This is not sur-
prising. As I said above, markets do not perfectly align the interests
of managers and investors. Nonetheless, the findings to date have two
aspects. They suggest (a) that the provisions in the articles at the time
the firm issued stock were valued by the investors, and (b) that the
13. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm,
in 28 J. L. & ECON. 179 (1985) (showing that firms with scattered shareholders
select and gain from incorporating in "liberal" states, while the more concentrated
the investments the more likely a firm is to select and gain from incorporation in
a "strict" state). For other confirming evidence on the benefits of competition among
jurisdictions see Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Cor-
porate Privileges, 14J. Legal Studies 129 (1985); R. Romano, Some Pieces of the Incor-
poration Puzzle (draft Nov. 1984).
14. DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakcorer Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth,
11 J. FIN. EcoN. 329 (1983), uses data on daily prices and concludes that announce-
ment of such amendments harms stockholders, although the firms making such changes
generally have stocks rising relative to market. This may be interpreted as evidence
that such firms are perceived as targets (hence the rise in price) but that the amend-
ments decrease somewhat the value of this chance to investors. Linn & McConnell,
An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of "Antitaisorer" Amendments on Common Stock Prices,
11 J. FIN. EcON. 361 (1983), uses monthly price data and concludes that the amend-
ments are associated with price increases. The differences in the data make the two
studies not contradictory, but they leave unanswered whether increased managerial
discretion here helps or harms investors. A study by the SEC released in November
1984 shows that different anti-takeover amendments have different effects, some
negative and some positive. One possible conclusion is that managerial discretion
to defeat the market for corporate control is harmful to investors. See Part III below.
Bhagat, The Effect of Pre-Emptive Right Amendments on Shardolder T$ealth, 12 J.
FIN. EcoN. 289 (1983), and Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulatire oting: The Value of Ainority
Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339 (1984), find that changes in certain
rules (the elimination of preemptive rights and cumulative voting) are associated with
declines in the price of stock. These rules are not obviously tied to "managers' discre-
tion" in running the firm; indeed, it is not clear just how preemptive rights and
cumulative voting affect managers' conduct.
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provisions the managers later selected were less highly valued. The
findings confirm that managers initially picked "good" rules and
indicate that the later change was undesirable. Perhaps such findings
indicate the utility of rules of law that make changes in the articles
difficult and scrutinize them carefully. Opportunism by managers seek-
ing to breach the optimal contract provisions written when a firm goes
public may be a significant problem. 15
It would be nice to have still further studies. Few if any firms
include in their constitutional documents any inhibitions on insiders'
trading in stock. It is sometimes said that this demonstrates that
managers are willing and able to take advantage of investors. If the
market were operating properly, the argument runs, managers would
have limited their compensation to such publicly approved forms as
salary, bonuses and stock options. Henry Manne and others have
argued in response that firms do not prohibit such trading by contract
because inside trading is beneficial to investors.16 Just to confuse things,
I have argued that even if insider trading is harmful to investors, we
should not expect to see contracts prohibiting it, because the contracts
are too costly to write and enforce. 17
These and other controversies about the effectiveness of the market
in extracting optimal promises from managers raising capital could
be illuminated by further empirical work. Financial economists are
designing and executing some of these tests. It is therefore premature
to say that the evidence proves or disproves any particular assessment
of the effects of managers' discretion.
15. The hardest questions in corporate law concern arrangements that are
adopted or changed after the firm is under way and the capital has been raised.
Shareholders' approval of changes is likely to be unreliable as an indicator of their
interests, because scattered shareholders in publicly-held firms do not have the time,
information, or incentives to review all proposed changes. Thus doctrines of corporate
law refusing to allow shareholders to ratify waste (except unanimously) are well-founded.
Yet the rules for amending the rules are themselves part of the original articles, and
it is (or should be) possible to draft limitations on amendment. These most commonly
take the form of provisions designating some amendments as transactions from which
investors may dissent and demand appraisal. Moreover, amendments to governance
structures may spark proxy contests in which investors' attention is focused, and they
also may call forth takeover bids. On this reasoning, provisions for governance set
out in amendments to the articles should be fully enforced. This is not the place
to resolve such difficult issues, if they can be resolved at all.
16. H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966); Carlton & Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
17. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AoENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINEss 81 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985).
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The evidence does, however, support this more limited claim:
Markets induce managers seeking funds to promise investors govern-
ance structures that investors value, and the data do not reflect ability
on the part of managers to inflict systematic harm on investors by
selection of governance rules. An increase in managers' discretion does
not automatically lead investors to revise their estimates of return
downward. Even so modestly put, the data inflict heavy blows on the
Berle-Means-ALI hypothesis.
II. PRODUCT AND STOCK MARKETS:
COMPETITION TO GENERATE PROFITS
A. Theory
From the Berle and Means perspective, managers need pay in-
vestors just enough to keep the wolf from the door. The rest of the
profits they may keep for themselves. They will do this both by receiving
excessive salary and by appropriating information from the firm,
whether by engaging in inside trading or by allocating corporate op-
portunities to themselves. They will consume excessive perquisites,
which may take the form of needless fringe benefits (corporate jets
for personal pleasure) or power over others (arbitrary hirings, firings
and decisions regarding what to make and where to make it).
Berle and Means, like the ALI's drafters, portray competition,
after the firm is in business as ineffectual to induce managers to act
in investors' interests. Disinterested directors, the ALl reasons, will
not allow managers to keep the proceeds for themselves. They will
compel managers to foreswear self-dealing and to keep their noses to
the grindstones.
No one denies that managers can set up perquisites, act in arbitrary
ways, or make inferior decisions. There are plenty of examples of these
things.18 The question is not whether managers have discretion, but
18. Harold Demsetz has made a strong argument that managers who are also
substantial investors are more likely to take their income in perquisites (fringe benefits
and arbitrary authority) than are other managers. Demsetz reasons that the owner-
manager can obtain both tax benefits and on-the-job consumption from this strategy.
The owner-manager will consume on the job when this is more valuable to him than
the consumption at home that could be purchased with equivalent after-tax income.
A non owner-manager gets only the consumption value of perquisites, which may
be less than the value of money converted to consumption at home. Demsetz, The
Structure of Ownership and the Thloyy of the Firm, 26J. L. & EcoN. 375 (1983) [hereinafter
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how much they have, and whether this amount can be reduced by
legal rules that are worth the cost. The answers depend on whether
"automatic" devices are effective in reducing, although not eliminating,
the divergence of interest between investors and managers once the
firm is under way. The argument that there are effective "automatic"
devices follows.
After they have raised capital, the managers depend on the firms'
profits for their salary and perquisites. Even if the managers' inside
position gives them great ability to take advantage of the investors,
they still find it advantageous to run the firms so as generally to max-
imize profits. Then there is a larger kitty into which they can dip.
This may show up in the value of stock holdings and bonuses; in the
longer run it controls salary as well.
From this perspective the question is not how to overcome the
effects of managers' self-interest but how to put that self-interest to
good use. Self-dealing transactions are one method of curtailing agency
costs. To see why, consider the essential contradiction of the agency
relation: the principal wants to hire the agent's dedicated service, yet
the agent's loyalty remains largely to his own interests. To induce
the agent to pursue the principal's interests, the principal must pro-
mise the agent a reward for success; yet the reward is itself a reduc-
tion in the principal's return, a cost of the agency relation. The greater
the reward for success, the more dedicated the agent to the task and
the better the result in pursuit of the principal's goals; yet the greater
the reward, the less desirable the whole arrangement for the principal.
There is a delicate balance. Some gains must be apportioned to the
agent, some to the principal. Like all balancing efforts, there is no
one "right" answer. Which apportionment methods work best-or
work least poorly-is determined by observing which lead to success
in the market.
The appeal to the agent's self-interest is an indispensable ingre-
dient in making the agency relation work. The trick in constructing
a corporate governance structure is to align the interests of the agents
with those of the investors, not to pretend that self-interest is a
pestiferous thing to be conquered. In large firms managers hold stock
(and are paid in stock options, phantom stock, and bonuses) so that
managers' prosperity depends on the success of the equity investors.
cited as Demsetz]. Certainly many of the customary examples of high-handed manage-
ment (Henry Ford is a prime example) come from firms in which the manager was
owner as well. Nonetheless, it is not necessary to pursue this insight here.
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Similarly, the trustee under a bond indenture often is a large bank
that independently loans money to the firm. This makes the trustee's
reward depend on the repayment of the firm's debt, and it also in-
duces the trustee to gather information and superintend the managers.
The promise of advancement within the managerial structure also
aligns interests. Those most interested in advancement are the second
and third tier of managers. These people not only want to move up
but also have the best information about how the higher-ups are doing.
They are therefore one logical group of watchdogs in the investors'
interest. 19 The investors gain if they are present on the board of direc-
tors, serving in that role. On this logic, a reduction in the number
of "inside" directors, to make room for independent directors who
have both less information about the firm and less reason to insist
that the top managers perform up to standard, would be a step
backward.
Some number of disinterested directors could serve a watchdog
role too, because these would be particularly effective in monitoring
the kinds of conflicts of interests that firms deliberately create in order
to improve the incentives of managers. Nothing in this line of argument
suggests that there is something "wrong" with outside directors. But
the number of such directors that will benefit the firm is an empirical
question. Outsiders give the firm an improved ability to monitor con-
flicts; outsiders cost the firm some of the self-interest that drives direc-
tors to find and pursue profitable business ventures. They, too, face
an agency cost: diligence versus leisure. Their very disinterestedness
makes leisure and carelessness more attractive. The outsiders also know
less about the business than the interested directors. If they work
substantially full time at the firm to acquire information, they become
"inside" directors; if they do not spend substantially full time at the
firm, though, they will never know enough to fulfill their monitoring
functions. You can't run General Motors on ten hours a month.
This analysis suggests that, although there are functions for
independent directors (which is why firms voluntarily have them), the
functions are quite limited. The less-knowledgeable, non-interested
directors may serve as passive evaluators of the performance of
managers, and they may be able to initiate changes in the managerial
team if performance falls off or the interest-alignment devices malfunc-
tion. It is unlikely, though, that outside directors could make investors
19. See Fana, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. EcoN. 288
(1980); Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J. L. & Ecov. 301 (1983).
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better off by reviewing most transactions in advance; their distance
from the firm and their lack of interest ensures that they will not know
enough to make discriminating choices.
There are other forms of control that do not appeal to the self-
interest of managers. Professional investors continuously monitor
ongoing firms, because they (or the funds they represent) have large
sums at stake. When their assessment of the managers' dedication and
performance falls, the price of the stock falls too. The lower price makes
it harder for the firm to raise new capital in competition against other
firms with more dedicated managers, and this puts great pressure on
managers to improve. The higher the price of capital, the higher the
firm's cost in making and supplying goods. The higher its cost, the
less it can sell in competition with other firms that adopt superior
management-control devices. It also makes less per sale. Lower pro-
fits mean diminished ability to divert benefits (and increased chance
of replacement).
Although this chain from lower stock prices to lower sales to new
managers seems a bit long, nothing in the economic treatment sug-
gests that the effects occur immediately. The consequences of inferior
managerial structures may take years to come home to roost when
the performance is only "a little" sub-par. Yet recall that we are ex-
amining how markets influence governance structures, not particular acts
of managers given the governance structure. The ALI proposes new
governance structures, not new managers. The governance structures
of firms are the product of decades of evolution under competitive
pressure. Market forces that operate "in the long run" are exactly the
forces that determine governance structures.
Back to capital markets. Other participants there also act as sur-
rogates for the investors. The stock exchanges flourish when trading
volume is high. The willingness of people to trade depends in large
measure on their belief that they will get a fair deal. Thus it is in
the interest of stock exchanges to establish rules for the protection of
investors, and managers who seek to attract money will submit to these
rules to obtain the benefit of being listed with other firms similarly
constrained. All stock exchanges have significant listing rules and had
them before the advent of regulation in 1934. For example, firms listed
on the NYSE must obtain the approval of shareholders before issuing
new stock exceeding 18% of the value of outstanding stock, and all
stock must have voting rights; listed firms also must make certain timely
disclosures and have audit committees.
The investment banks and underwriters through which firms issue
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stock seek to maintain their own reputations. Accordingly, they make
careful inspections of managerial quality and the accuracy of represen-
tations before they sell the firm's stock to the public. To obtain the
endorsement of these firms, managers must make believable pledges
to act in the investors' interests.
Competition in product markets has a similar effect. When
managers' performance falls off, the firm's profits also fall off. Other
firms, with more capable managers, will make the sales and the pro-
fits. This has two consequences. One works through the price of stock
and the monitoring of market professionals. A drop in the price of
stock implies higher cost of capital and still greater difficulties in product-
market competition. The other is that when profits drop, managers
simply have less they can divert to themselves. Even the managers
with the greatest discretion over the disposition of the firm's income
must produce income before they can dispose of it.20
There is, finally, competition for the position of manager. In order
to obtain desirable positions, would-be managers will offer to work
for the competitive wage. Those who offer the best deal to the firm
ultimately end up in control, just as those who offer to sell other in-
puts (whether steel or office space) on the most attractive terms end
up as suppliers. Even if the most senior managers are in a position
of complete control, they have no reason to let junior managers skim
off profits. The senior managers therefore place their juniors under
effective controls in order to keep the most for themselves. When the
juniors are promoted, the controls stay in place, and the investors
receive the benefits of the process.
B. Evidence
So much for the theory. What of the evidence? Once more it
is hard to design tests in which the Berle-Means-ALI and investors'-
welfare approaches give significantly different predictions. One can
show, for example, that stock market prices change quickly and
reasonably accurately to reflect available information about firms. 21
One possible inference is that the disciplinary mechanism discussed
above (self-centered managers drive down prices, and this in turn
20. For a formal demonstration of how this induces managers to act in
investors' interests, see Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentire Scheme, 14 BELL
J. EcON. 366 (1983).
21. See R. BREALEY, supra note 11; J. Lone & M. Hamilton, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1973). Reasonably accurate is not perfectly ac-
curate, but here (as in horseshoes) close is good enough. See Gilson & Kraakman,
The Mechanics of Market Efficienc, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
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penalizes the managers for various reasons) is effective. The adherent
of the Berle-Means-ALI position could concede the stock price effect,
though, without conceding the effect of prices on managers' conduct.22
Some other test-outside the stock market-is therefore necessary.
Stock Ownership. One quick and dirty approach is to see whether
managers believe they have the power to exploit investors. If managers
believe the Berle-Means-ALI hypothesis, they will not invest in the
stock of the firms they manage. Why should they pick their own
pockets?
It turns out, however, that managers own stock-great quantities
of stock. And the larger the firm, the more stock the managers own.
Harold Demsetz computed the stock holdihgs by managers of firms
from 1973-82. He found that the managers of the ten largest Fortune
500 firms owned outright an average of $151,621 of their firms' stock. 23
Managers of middle Fortune 500 firms owned an average of $124,560
of their firms' stock. The managers of the bottom ten in the Fortune
500 owned only $27,134 of their firms' stock on average. The "top"
managers of all of these firms own substantially more, often millions
of dollars worth. And data show that the value of firms rises when
they adopt compensation plans increasing managers' ownership
interest.24
It is important to distinguish ownership by value from ownership
by percentage. As firm size increases, managers own smaller percent-
ages of all outstanding stock. This is what Berle and Means reported
and what Edward Herman confirms is still true. 25 The divergence in
percentage of ownership is the source of the cost of the agency rela-
22. Oliver Williamson reports that a decline in profits is associated with a
sharp reduction in the consumption of perquisites, such as "excessive" staff, that
managers may prefer to compensation and may be able to employ when market
discipline is weak. Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 1032
(1963). This suggests a direct effect of profits on managerial conduct. Other studies
find a similar effect as either product market competition or potential competition
for corporate control increases. E.g., O'Hara, Property Rights and the Financial Firm,
24 J. L. & EcON. 317 (1981).
23. Demsetz, supra note 18, at 388. This is one of the most modest estimates
I could find. Edward Herman and even Ralph Nader report larger figures. E. Herman,
Corporate Control, Corporate Power 91-95 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Herman]
(holdings averaging $920,000 in 1974-75); R. Nader, M. Green &J. Seligman, Tam-
ing the Giant Corporation 116 (1976) (chief executives of largest corporations own average
of $1,566,009 of firm's stock).
24. Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensa-
tion Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 11 J. ACCT. & EcON. 115 (1985).
25. Herman, supra note 23, at 87-93.
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tion. Yet for many purposes the absolute quantity of stock ownership
may be as important as the percentage of the firm's stock managers
hold. Suppose a manager with an annual income of $200,000 and $2
million of wealth holds half of his wealth in the stock of his employer.
Then a 10% drop (from $1 million to $900,000) in the market value
of his stock is equivalent to a 50% reduction in salary. The stock owner-
ship quickly brings home the consequences of the firm's doing well
or poorly. It aligns the manager's interests with those of the
stockholders, inducing the manager not only to perform well himself
but also to ensure that other managers do likewise. The manager feels
the consequences of price changes more quickly than an ordinary
stockholder, whose portfolio will be more diversified and who therefore
cares more about the market as a whole than about the prospects of
a single firm.
Sources of Compensation. Stock ownership is not the only device
aligning managers' interests with those of equity investors. Managers
also design stock option plans (the right to obtain stock in the future
at today's price, creating a "bargain" if the price rises) and phantom
stock plans (bonuses paid according to increases in the price of stock).
These and other stock-based compensation plans do not show up as
stock currently "owned" by the managers, but they have similar effects.
The hypothesis that market forces induce managers to act in
investors' interests predicts that a substantial portion of managers' com-
pensation will come through devices based on the price of stock.
Managers will get paid only to the extent (other) investors do well.
The Berle-Means-ALI hypothesis predicts, to the contrary, that
managers' compensation will come in salary, bonuses, perquisites, and
other forms that are at least potentially at the expense of investors.
The evidence supports the investors' welfare hypothesis. Wilbur
Lewellen reported in 1971 the results of a survey of compensation pat-
terns at 50 of the largest manufacturers, 15 of the largest retailers
and 15 small manufacturers, between 1940 and 1963. He separated
the managers' compensation into cash-based (salary, loans, pension
contributions, and the value of perquisites) and stock-based (dividends,
appreciation or depreciation of shares owned, and the value of op-
tions). He found that for the top managers of the largest firms, the
after-tax value of the stock-based compensation was three to five times
the after-tax value of the other compensation. 2
6
26. W. LEWELLEN, THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGF!F-..%ET (1971). Sze also
Lewellen & Huntsman, Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance, 60 A',t. Eco.. RE%-.
45 (1970).
19841
HeinOnline  -- 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 559 1984
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
Surveys covering more recent years confirm the dependence of
total managerial compensation on the performance of the firm's stock.
George Benston's survey of the earnings of managers of 29 large con-
glomerates in 1970-75 shows that stock-based compensation dominated
other forms of remuneration. Benston added stock- and cash-based
returns. In years when the firms' stock rose 30%, these executives
made more than $1 million apiece; in years when the stock fell by
that amount, they lost more than $1 million apiece. 27 Other surveys
show similar dominance of stock performance in the total compensa-
tion package.
Relation Between Performance and Compensation. The Berle-
Means-ALI hypothesis and the investors' welfare hypothesis make dif-
ferent predictions about the relation between managers' compensa-
tion and the performance of their firms. Berle and Means predict
rewards for absolute size, because managers of larger firms have con-
trol over more resources (there is more to divert), yet investors' con-
trol is diluted. 28 They predict little or no reward for performance,
because managers with control can pay themselves no matter what
and need not attend to investors' interests. The investors' welfare
hypothesis predicts rewards for both size and profit. The reward for
size comes about because larger pools of assets call for the supervision
of higher-quality managers, and firms must pay for the extra skills
they need. 29 The reward for profit serves as the spur for managers
to act in investors' interests.
The data strongly support the investors' welfare hypothesis.
Managers' compensation depends on both size and profit. There are
so many studies of this relation that I report only three of the most
recent.3 0
27. Benston, The Self-Serving Management Hypothesis: Some Evidence, 11 J.
ACCT. & EcON. 67 (1985). The actual figures for years when stocks generally declined:
$1,328,000 average loss in 1972; $715,000 average loss in 1971; $710,000 average
loss in 1974. For high-growth years: $1,138,000 average gain in 1971; $1,735,000
average gain in 1975. For all years and outcomes, the value of stock changes swamped
salaries by a ratio of five to one.
28. See also W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1967).
29. A manager does more for investors by taking a $10 billion firm from
6.5% to 6.7% return on investment than by taking a $1 billion firm from 10% to
111% return. Because compensation should be related to the manager's marginal
influence on the absolute return, it is necessary to look with caution at studies that
estimate average (rather than marginal) profits or examine rates of return on
investment.
30. See Jensen & Zimmerman, Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor
Market, 11 J. AcCT. & ECON. 3 (1985), for an overview. Existing surveys in the legal
literature overlook most of these studies, and so they understate the power of market
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Barry Harris looked at the compensation of managers of 19 firms
in the food industry (all in the 250 largest of the Fortune 500) from
1952-72. He found that a 1% increase in sales was associated with
a 0.45% increase in executive compensation, and that a 1% increase
in accounting profits was associated with a 0.23% increase in executive
compensation. 31 Kevin Murphy looked at the compensation of 366
executives from 57 of the largest manufacturing firms. He found that
a 1% increase in revenues was associated with a 0.18% increase in
total earnings (salary, bonus, and the value of new stock options),
and that a 1% increase in the rate of return on assets was associated
with a 0.15% increase in earnings. 32 In both studies, reductions in
sales, profits, and return on assets brought corresponding reductions
in compensation.
The most interesting of the recent studies has been performed
by Rick Antle and Abbie Smith. They looked at the three highest-
paid executives in 39 large firms between 1947 and 1977. They in-
quired whether compensation (which they defined as tie after-tax value
of salary, bonuses, stock options, pension contributions, stock holdings,
and some other ingredients) depended on the performance of the firm
relative to other firms in the same industry. Many managers can ob-
tain "average" performance, they reasoned; if every firm in an in-
dustry is prospering (or failing), there is nothing special for which its
managers should be rewarded (or penalized). If, on the other hand,
some firms stand out in profit (or loss), the managers should reap
the rewards of their success (or failure). They found that about 65%
of the variance in total executive compensation can be explained by
differences in the firms' return on assets (that is, that compensation
strongly depends on performance), and that most of this variance also
depends on performance relative to the rest of the industry.3 3 This
strongly supports the investors' welfare hypothesis.
forces. E.g., Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or for the Courts?
8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247-52 (1983).
31. B. HARRIS, ORGANIZATION: THE EFFECT ON LARGE CoRPoRATioNs 25-39
(1983).
Note that for purposes of this and other studies, a -1% increase" is relative
to the previous sales or profits. So an increase in profits from $100,000 to $101,000
is a 1% increase, and a change from a return of 10% on invested capital to a return
of 10.1% also is a 1% increase.
32. K. MURPHY, ABILITY, PERFORMANCE, AND CoMPENsATIoN: AN E.mPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE WAGE PROFILES (Nov. 1983 draft). Set also Murphy, Corporate
Performance and Managerial Remuneration, 11 J. Accr. & ECON. 11 (1985).
33. R. ANTLE & A. SMITH, AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION IN'TO THE RELATIVE
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES (Nov. 1983 draft).
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Many of these studies show little relation between managers' salary
and their firms' performance. Some people find this conclusion and
infer that the market for managerial services does not work well. It
is always necessary to adjust, as the studies I have mentioned do, for
other aspects of managers' compensation. A rule restricting the fluc-
tuation of salaries has many attractions to a firm. It provides managers
with some income through times thick and thin, while changes in the
value of managers' portfolio of holdings provide the incentive for bet-
ter performance.
Relation Between Performance and Structure of Ownership. The
Berle-Means-ALI hypothesis has implications for the effect of the struc-
ture of ownership on profits, managerial compensation, and the like.
If inability of investors to control managers is deleterious, we would
expect that as firms grow and holdings become more widely scattered,
the performance of managers would decline, and with it the firm's
profits. On this view managers' compensation would rise as the degree
of investors' control declined. To the extent these implications depend
on effects through the level of profits, they have been tested above
and found wanting because compensation depends strongly on profit.
It is possible to test them more directly, too.
One way to do this is to construct the relation between size of
firm and managerial compensation and to determine whether the con-
centration of ownership affects the relation. We expect managers' com-
pensation to rise with the size of firms, for reasons already explained.
The question, then, is whether the managers of firms without effec-
tive investor oversight do better than might be expected from know-
ing the size of assets alone. George Stigler and Claire Friedland, using
data available to (but unused by) Berle and Means, found that they
do not.3 4 They found that in a regression of salaries on the logarithm
of assets, control type (management-controlled, shareholder-controlled,
etc.) had no effect. Herman reports a similar conclusion. 35
Stigler and Friedland also inquired whether the profitability of
firms depended on the concentration of control. The utility of "pro-
fit" studies is open to serious question because of the great difficulties
in interpreting accounting numbers. Nonetheless, to the extent there
are useful profit data, the prediction of the Berle and Means approach
34. Stigler & Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means,
26 J. L. & EcON. 237 (1983).
35. Herman, supra note 23, at 112.
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is unambiguous: the less control investors have, the more the managers
will shirk, divert opportunities, consume perquisites, etc., and thus
the lower the profit per unit of investment. Stigler and Friedland
examined four sets of data for different industries and different years.
In only-one of these was there a significant effect of the sort predicted
by Berle and Means. 36 And when this group of firms was re-evaluated
using a slightly different format (using as an independent variable the
percentage of shares controlled by the 20 largest investors, rather than
a dichotomous owner vs. manager control variable) the effect vanished.
A different source of data suggests that control by managers is
not fatal to profits. An extensive literature in antitrust reports find-
ings that larger firms, and those in more highly concentrated industries,
consistently obtain profits exceeding those of smaller firms.3 7 It also
turns out that within the concentrated industries, the largest firms con-
sistently earn the largest rates of profit.3 8 Once more, one may doubt
whether these "profitability" studies tell us much of interest. To the
extent they do, however, they are at odds with the Berle-Means-ALI
approach. Larger firms generally have more widely-scattered holdings.
Under the Berle and Means story, they therefore should earn lower
profits. In fact, they earn higher profits.
Whether we attribute these profits to innovation and efficient con-
duct of the business, as some would do, or to oligopoly and monopoly,
as other argue, is irrelevant. Both efficiency and monopoly may be
the results of managers driven to act in investors' interests. (Those
36. The other three had negative coefficients on the control variable, indicating
that management control was associated with smaller profits, but in each the size
of this effect was too small to be statistically significant. (That is, it was so small
that a statistician would not be confident that it was different from zero). See also
Stano, Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. EcoN. J. 272 (1975)
(reporting a negative, but not statistically significant, relation between degree of con-
trol by managers and corporate profitability; also reporting a strongly positive and
significant relation between absolute amount of stock held by managers and firm's
profitability). For a summary of other work, much of it reporting similar negative
but not significant results, see DeAlessi, Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in
Large Corporations, 28 J. FIN. 839 (1973).
37. Weiss, The Structure-Condut-Performane Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 1104 (1979), summarizes many of these studies. See also INDUSTRIAL Co.c'-F_-
TRATION: THE NEv LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann & J.F. Weston, eds.,
1974).
38. Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20J.L. & Eco.%.
229 (1977); Demsetz, Industy Structure, Market Riraly, and Public Poli,, 16 J. L. &
EcoN. 1 (1973). See also Smirlock, Gilligan & Marshall, Tobin's q and the Structure-
Performance Relationship, 74 Aht. ECON. REv. 1051 (1984) (finding that relatively large
firms enjoy higher ratio of stock price to asset value, suggesting higher profits).
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who assert that managers disserve investors' interests also frequently
argue that managers create monopolies, evade pollution and labor laws,
bribe their customers, and otherwise expose themselves to criminal
and civil liability, as well as loss of employment and social status, in
pursuit of profits. Managers willing to violate the law must perceive
themselves under substantial pressure to produce profits.)
III. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL:
COMPETITION FOR POSITION
A. Theory
Berle and Means paint the firm as a static institution. "The
managers" have "control" and retain it. The powerless investors must
accept the crumbs the managers hand out. One of the dynamic elements
Berle and Means omit is competition among teams of managers to
have control. It is not written that today's managerial team will be
in charge tomorrow; to the contrary, several devices create the possibility
of revolutionary change.
However much (or little) power investors have in the Berle-Means-
ALI world, managers have a great deal more. Each team of managers
may use this position to compete for the control of other corporate
assets. Indeed, it is useful to think of the process of management as
an ongoing competitive struggle among teams of managers to exercise
control. The profits to be made in changes of control induce managerial
teams to monitor each other, and this monitoring by management may
be much more effective than monitoring by passive investors. Those
who are best at running firms will enlarge the span of their control;
those who falter will be replaced. If the faltering team will not yield
by resignation or merger, the potential replacement will use force, such
as the hostile tender offer or proxy contest.
The corporate control contest is the direct answer to the agency
cost problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control.
When the costs of widely scattered ownership become too large-
perhaps when managers fail to act in investors' interest-then the in-
vestment interests may be gathered up. The control fight reconcen-
trates ownership. It makes use of safeguards built into the shares when
they were issued; the shares are freely tradable and carry votes that
allow their owners to take control. The existing managers recognize
that they will be subjected to a control contest if they do not act in
investors' interest; this realization prompts them to behave appropriately
whether or not a contest materializes.
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B. Evidence
Berle and Means thought that managers were entrenched. They
therefore portrayed control contests as of little use. The managers could
stave off challenges. Worse, a control contest would just swap one
set of managers for another, and on average the new managers would
be no better for the investors than the old. If managers are imper-
vious to the influence of the market for corporate control, we should
see few contests of any sort and little or no improvement in shareholders'
welfare when contests occur. If the investors' welfare hypothesis is cor-
rect, we should see distinct wealth increases associated with contests,
and laws that decrease the efficacy of control contests should produce
decreases in investors' wealth. The data support the investors' welfare
hypothesis. 39
1. Proxy Contests
Proxy contests for corporate control are associated with substan-
tial gains to investors, on the order of 5-10% of the total value of
the equity interest. 40 Stock appreciates when the contest is announced
and during the duration of the contest. The gains exist whether the
insurgents win or lose. This may show that the contest keeps the in-
cumbents on their toes, or it may be associated with the assembly
of substantial blocs of stock during the contest. (See the discussion
below on bloc assembly.) The data cleanly refute any notion that proxy
contests are unimportant or that they give control to "raiders" or
"looters" who enrich themselves at the expense of investors.
2. Bloc Assembly
When one person assembles a substantial minority bloc in a firm,
he may be able to exercise effective control because other interests
are too widely spread to unite against him. It is often said that the
owner of 25% of the stock of a large firm has "control." The owner
of a smaller bloc may be on his way to control (perhaps against the
wishes of existing managers). Berle and Means would predict that the
assembly of such control blocs would give managers extra power by
making insurrection by the investors that much more difficult. The
39. Jensen & Ruback, The Markt for Corporate Control. The Sdentific Eidence,
11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983), collects and evaluates most of the available evidence. The
existence of this fine survey article makes it unnecessary for me to clutter this paper
with supporting footnotes.
40. Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governanze: A Study of Proxy Contests, II J.
FIN. EcoN. 401 (1983).
1984]
HeinOnline  -- 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 565 1984
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
owners of blocs may divert profits to themselves, gaining more in their
roles as insiders than they lose in their roles as investors. The existence
of control blocs therefore should be associated with decreases in price.
Under the investors' welfare hypothesis, the opposite should occur.
The interests of the owner of the bloc are aligned with the interests
of other investors; each wants shares to appreciate in price. The bloc's
owner therefore acts to increase the firm's profits. The existence of
the bloc reduces the agency costs of management. 41
Again the data support the investors' welfare hypothesis. Bloc
assembly is associated with increases in the price of stock outside the
bloc. The larger the bloc, the greater the increase. When firms repur-
chase existing blocs (thus reducing the concentration of ownership),
the price of stock outside the bloc falls by more than the value of the
premium paid to the bloc's owner. 42 Bloc assembly, and its effects
on control, therefore appears to be useful in controlling the agency
costs of management.
3. Tender Offers and Mergers
Both mergers and successful tender offers leave one team of
managers in control of assets formerly managed by two teams. The
resulting firm is larger and, by the Berle and Means approach, less
subject to effective governance by investors. They would expect such
transactions to result in a diminution of wealth. Under the investors'
welfare hypothesis, in contrast, mergers and tender offers are the visible
consequences of competition among managers for control, and the vic-
tors should be the managers who can make best use of the assets.
Control changes should be accompanied by increases in the value of
the assets.
One way to investigate the effect of control changes is to ask
whether firms do better in states that facilitate such changes. In some
industries there are significant differences from state to state in the
41. A more complete explanation of the dynamics of control contests of all
sorts may be found in Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE
L.J. 698 (1982), which also addresses questions concerning the effects of investors'
portfolio diversification.
42. See Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repur-
chases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (1983); Bradley &
Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 301 (1983);
Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Informa-
tion on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972); Office of the Chief Economist, Securities
and Exchange Commission, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock
Prices (Sept. 11, 1984).
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amenability of a firm to takeover. Christopher James examined bank-
ing, an industry for which the variation is quite pronounced. He found
that banks that are not subject to acquisition display substantially more
managerial slack than banks that could be taken over.3 This supports
the thesis that the market for corporate control protects investors.
Other evidence, which Richard Ruback discusses in this volume,
establishes that transfers of control by merger and tender offer are
associated with very large increases in the value of the investments,
increases on the order of 30% -50%. The appreciation of the acquired
firm's stock is spectacular, but the combined value of the acquiring
and acquired firm also increases substantially, by an average exceeding
10%. Even the stock not acquired in a tender offer appreciates in value,
so that one cannot explain the premium as a payoff to some investors
in exchange for access to a pool of assets that can be raided or exploited.
The investors view the new managers as unambiguously preferable
to the old. When a merger proposal or tender offer is withdrawn, on
the other hand, the price of stock falls. If no acquisition is completed
within two years, all appreciation in value disappears.
The existence of the premium shows, that the combination is
beneficial to investors. The size of the premium is nonetheless troubl-
ing. There are few acquisitions today at premiums in the 1-201% range.
This means that when combinations could produce benefits of 20%
or less to investors, they are unlikely to occur. The takeover device
is not as beneficial to investors as it could be.
One shortcoming is that such control transactions are very costly.
The expenses of investment banks, lawyers, and printers, the risks
of litigation, and other costs discourage control transactions in search
of small gains. Another difficulty is that the Williams Act substantially
raised the bidder's costs and facilitated defensive tactics by targets,
which raise the costs still farther." After the Williams Act, state takeover
laws, and the advent of defensive tactics, there have been fewer
acquisitions than there otherwise would have been, and the value of
acquisition programs has substantially declined. 45 Managers seek to
43. James, An Analysis of State Acquisition Laws on Managerial Effidency: The Case
of Bank Holding Company Acquisitions, 27 J. L. & EcoN. 211 (1984).
44. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1982); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market 77oy, the Aarket for Corporate Con-
trol, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TLx. L. REv. 1 (1978).
45. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371, 398-403 (1980) Schipper & Thompson,
Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Aferger Activity for Acquiring Firms, 11 J. FIN. ECoN.
85 (1983).
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defend against the acquisitions. Those who defend successfully harm
investors. 46 And as it turns out, the managers most likely to defend
are those who own the least stock in the firm-a collateral confirma-
tion of the findings of the influence of interest-alignment devices.4 7
Corporate acquisitions therefore must be seen as a safety valve,
as a response to substantial shortfalls in performance rather than as
an ordinary constraint on managers' conduct. Nonetheless, the existence
of this backstop influences the incentives of managers, who desire to
reduce the risk of their replacement. In conjunction with the many
devices discussed in the preceding sections, the market in acquisitions
offers still another way of inducing managers to act in investors'
interests.
4. Divestitures and Spinoffs
If the reorganization of management can lead to higher values
by combining assets, it also should be able to lead to higher values
by breaking up concentrations of assets. Spinoffs may reallocate assets
to managerial teams that can make better use of them. The Berle-
Means-ALI hypothesis, in contrast, portrays spinoffs as methods by
which managers can use inside information to divert opportunities to
themselves. This hypothesis predicts lower prices for the public's stock.
Once more the evidence supports the position that managers act in
investors' interests. When firms spin off assets to investors (creating
two firms from one) or sell blocs of assets to third parties, public
investors obtain gains of 71% to 10% on average . 4 These gains arise,
though, only when the spinoffs and sales are voluntary; transactions
needed to comply with regulatory orders produce no gains. The market
apparently can discriminate beneficial changes of control from others.
46. See Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in
a Merge?, 28J. L. & Econ. 151 (1985) (data showing that strategies designed to defeat
offers reduce wealth of investors); Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating
Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277 (1984) (data showing that firms defeating of-
fers cause substantial losses to investors; summary of other studies to same effect).
47. Walkling & Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid
Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54 (1984). See also Lewellen, Loderer & Rosenfeld, Merger
Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership, 11 J. AccT. & EcoN. 209 (1985).
48. Schipper & Smith, Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of
Voluntary Spin-offs, 12 J. FIN. EcoN. 437 (1983); Hite & Owers, Security Price Reactions
Around Corporate Spin-off Announcements, 12 J. FIN. EcoN. 409 (1983); Jain, The Effect
of Voluntary Sell-off Announcements on Shareholder Wealth, 42 J. FIN. 209 (1985);
A. Klein, Voluntary Corporate Divestitures: Motives and Consequences (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1983).
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5. Leveraged Buyouts
The existing managers of a firm are among the contestants in
any struggle for control. Just as there may be beneficial incentives
in the threat (or actuality) of an outside takeover, so there may be
gains from "inside takeovers"-going private transactions or leveraged
buyouts.
Berle and Means would portray these transactions as methods
of exploiting investors. The managers extinguish the investors' interests
at a price that may not reflect the firm's full value. Because of their
privileged position, the managers may hide important information or
manipulate the price of the transaction to the investors' disadvantage.
The investors' welfare hypothesis is that these transactions may reduce
the agency costs of management by turning the managers into owners
as well. The new manager-owners receive a greater share of gains at
the margin and therefore become more dedicated and effective agents.
4 9
These transactions also may be marked by restructuring of manage-
ment (one faction prevails over another). The existing managers (or
faction or managers) cannot take the firm private unless they pay more
than the pre-existing value of the stock. They also face competition
from other, outside groups and must offer more in order to obtain
control.
Here, too, the evidence refutes the Berle and Means approach.
Leveraged buyouts are associated with average premiums of about 30%
relative to the prior market price. 50 The investors thus receive substantial
gains, as large on average as those in mergers or tender offers. The
market for these arms' length transactions appears to constrain
managers from exploiting their position and ensures that much of the
gain is distributed to the original investors.
Perhaps more interesting, the data refute any claim that the
managers are exploiting privileged access to information. If informa-
tional inequalities are responsible for the premium price, we would
expect some of the premium to remain even after a going-private offer
49. These transactions are usually so highly leveraged that the managers will
receive little or no return in the early years; the firms profits must be used to retire
the debt. If the firm is less profitable than expected, the debtholders will become
the new controllers. If the managers make enough to pay off the debt, though, they
may become fabulously wealthy (in ten years or so) as the full owners of a profitable
firm. This large-stakes wager may be just the thing needed to create the incentives
for the managers to maximize the firm's value.
50. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going Prirate: Afinorivy Frtetzous and Stocrhoal.r
Wealth 27 J. L. & EcON. 367 (1984).
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has been withdrawn. The offer would cause some of the information
to leak to the market, and it also might set the stage for a competing
bid by outsiders. Yet this does not occur. When a going-private offer
is withdrawn, the entire premium vanishes. The leveraged buyout must
itself be the source of the benefits to investors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Something caused corporations to grow, some much faster than
others. Something caused investors willingly to part with their money.
Something led to the terms we see in corporate charters. These
"somethings" must generally be good for investors and consumers.
The firms under scrutiny are the survivors after all. Those that of-
fered terms less useful for investors and consumers are gone.
Why have the current corporate governance structures survived?
The hypothesis that managers design structures in investors' interest
has many testable implications. So does the Berle-Means-ALI hypothesis
about the relation between managers and investors. To the extent the
evidence permits the rendition of a verdict, it is that the Berle-Means-
ALI hypothesis may confidently be rejected. Its implications are not
true.
It is easier to reject a hypothesis than to confirm one. The available
evidence generally supports the investors' welfare hypothesis, but it
does not do so on every occasion. A few studies have found categories
of activities by managers that appear to harm investors. We therefore
must be careful in assessing proposals for legal rules. Some rules may
be "market perfecting" in the same sense as antitrust. They may make
it easier to detect or penalize shortcomings of managers.
In constructing such rules, though, we must start with the best
available data. These data suggest, although they cannot prove, that
incentives present in existing markets generally induce managers to
act in investors' interests. No proposal for change legitimately may
be based on the Berle and Means hypothesis that managers consistently
act at the expense of investors. Proposals for new rules should perfect
the market by reducing its costs. One example would be rules that
reduce the costs of waging contests for corporate control. Methods
of writing legal rules that mimic the contracts that investors and
managers would strike-if they could write and enforce agreements
with no transactions costs-also hold some prospect of benefit. Most
of the state law rules and fiduciary doctrines now in force are of this
sort: they supply contractual terms subject to variance by such actual
bargains as investors and managers find worthwhile.
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The data supply no support for market-defeating rules. That is,
none of the studies recounted above offers the slightest justification
for legal rules that reverse actual contractual decisions or frustrate the
making of new ones. The process by which corporate governance has
evolved has been a mixture of innovation by states and innovation
by firms. Some corporations have found new and better ways to
establish governance-whether these ways concern voting or methods
of internal organization, such as hierarchical versus multidivisional
organization. The firms that have adopted the best structures (sometimes
contracting around state law) have prospered. Then states write laws
that use existing governance structures as models, as starting points
that prevail unless negated by contract. The states' adoption of the
new structures reduces the costs to other firms of adopting and
implementing them. States that make the choices most beneficial to
investors will attract incorporations.
This evolutionary process goes on continuously. There is no reason
to "freeze" it with a uniform set of rules that cannot be altered by
contract. Even if the ALI could pick "the best" rules for today's average
corporations, it is unlikely that these rules would be best for all firms
or that they would remain "best" for long for the average firm.
Investors gain when managers are free to invent new devices and to
use them in their pursuit of capital. Those who want to still the power
of competition must make a case far more powerful than they have
to date.
It is sometimes said that the disagreement between those who want
to impose new restraints on corporate governance and those who oppose
such restraints is a matter of "faith" or "ideology." All too often,
the question is posed as whether one has "faith in the market." Putting
the question this way implies that the data are weak or their
interpretation problematic. That is just not so.
Benefits to investors are not a matter of faith. Protection of
investors by markets is not a matter of belief. Competition among
managers is not a political creed. No one should have "faith" in the
market. We should resort, rather, to evidence about the market. And
that evidence suggests the power of competition and existing ar-
rangements in protecting investors.
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